
QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY

Learning Goals
(simple)
Predict outcome of quantum polarization measurements

· Describe BB84 quantum crypto protocol and why it is secure

Announcements
What I Did This Summer, Fri 12:30-1:45, 75545
102

Exit Tickets



Problem: How to share secret key?!

Current Solution: Public Key Cryptography (PSI)


Looming Problem: Eve with a quantum computer can crack

PKC

When.	ONLE	door	C\0	Ses,	anothe	کد ر	loor	opens	 ٠
		iblic Ke				•		Crypto	co1.
	. (cypto	0					٠	

To do guantum crypto, need guantum particles

Photons => individual particles of light



Easily 10st

thard to create + detect (single photons)

Polarizer Demo: If insert diagonal filter between horizontal and vertical polarizers, how much light will come through?

A. no diag. B. Single filter C. Same as D. More than Single filter Single filter


Thotons + Tolarizers Vertical polarized Filter with same polarization diagonally polarized Filter with perpendicular polarization Filter with 45° /2 polarization "collapse" horizontally polarized

*Behavior only depends on angle between photon polarization + polarizer

VExiting photons have same polarization as filter

Group	Mork
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
Q: Name, pronouns (optional), what kind of group problem solver are you?




(lamp emits each photon with random polarization).

- · What polarization(s) do exiting photons have?
- · If T photons hit polarizer B, how many photons exit polarizer C?

(Learning target QII -> Foundational)



Exit Tickets



- · Filters > single photon?
- · Syllabus · PSETS upcoming
- · Exams


No video ~

Quantum (rypto (BB84) (Eve knows L) O. Alice + Bob pick L >> n qubit state (basis bit) (info bit) vert/ S o o たりかけたり = トナン diag なしか一点しか=一つ random, e large number keeps private a, b & 80,13 randowly. 1. Alice chooses a: 10/0/1011 At it time step A sends b libli a; b; in photon to Bob. i:123


(measurement basis bit)	Measurement	Measurement	basis
	D*	3107,117	· 3
	D-#	[1	
2. Bob chooses $C \in \mathcal{Z} \in \mathcal{A}$		9	ent Ci
3. Records outcome	$\frac{1}{2} d_i = \frac{1}{2}$	or if det	ection -
ex: 123- 1st Photon		2nd Photon	· · · · · ·
ρ= 11 ···	D+	Ju . The	D-+
$C = 11 - \cdots$ $d = 0/1 1$			


- Q: If $a_i = C_i$ then

 A) $b_i = d_i$ B) $b_i \neq d_i$ C) $b_i = d_i$ 1/2 the time
- Q: If ai fci then
 - A) $b_i = d_i$ B) $b_i \neq d_i$ C) $b_i' = d_i$ 1/2 the time
- 4. Alice + Bob publicly announce a, c strings (Eve knows)
- 5. Alice + Bob throw out any bits of b, d corresponding to bits where a + c. Remaining bits of b, d match => call those strings b', d! Secret Key!



A Has to make their choice before a, c announced.





- · What are d, f for each e?
 - · , e,= 2,;
 - e e = 0;

- · Other cases where a = c?
- · Why don't we care about cases where a + c?

The more Eve interfers, the more b' \(\forall \) (b', \(\forall \) = remaining \\

+ the more Eve knows about b', \(\forall \).

Seems bad \(\tau \) actually ok.

6. A + B make public a random subset of bits of b', \(\forall \) to detect Eve

Remaining strings: b", d"

7. Alice	+ Bab error correct b", d"	(parity checks)	٠
	Out-come.		٠
	$oldsymbol{ heta}$		٠
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		•
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		•
			•
18.1A 1 B	do privacy amplification		٠
	Outcome		•
			٠
			•

As a group Review BB84 protocol

- "Generate questions
- · BB84 produces a secret key that is guaranteed secure from any evestropper. What is the quantum secret sauce?